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COMMENTS Z 1
The next step was to consider the Fellowship of Humanity in light of
the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.8 8 This amend-
ment does not restrict the government from legislating in this field. Every
state and the District of Columbia has a constitutional or statutory pro-
vision exempting church property from taxation. If the exemption is
limited to those who advocate theism, the humanists argue that such an
interpretation encourages particular religious doctrines and thus violates
the division between Church and State. The California court reasoned
that if the state cannot constitutionally subsidize religion under the First
Amendment, then it cannot limit tax exemptions to theistic religions.
The state, said the California court, has no power to determine the
validity of religious beliefs. It must apply the purely objective test of
whether or not the belief occupies the same place in the lives of its hold-
ers that orthodox beliefs occupy in the lives of believing majorities.
CONCLUSION
The Fellowship of Humanity and Washington Ethical Society cases
accept a new legal definition of religion,-at least in the field of taxation.
In such a concept the test of belief or non-belief in a Supreme Being is
not a factor. Religion simply includes
(1) a belief, not necessarily referring to supernatural powers; (2) a cult, in-
volving a gregarious association openly expressing the belief; (3) a system of
moral practice directly resulting from an adherence to the belief; and (4) an
organization within the cult designed to observe the tenets of belief. The con-
tent of the belief is of no moment. 34
This test does not involve the determination of what the particular belief,
dogma, or doctrine of members must be.
Two cases do not in themselves establish a trend, but it will be interest-
ing to observe the influence, if any, of these cases in other jurisdictions.
33 U.S. Const. Amend. I: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."
34 Authority cited note 31 supra at 406.
THE CONCEPT OF UNILATERAL CONTRACTS
IN ILLINOIS
The name "unilateral" has been suggested for contracts executed on one side
and executory on the other, or at least for such contracts of this class as are
created by performing the act required for acceptance of the offer. Contracts
of this class are distinguishable from others in the fact that in the other simple
contracts the acceptance furnishes the consideration, leaving the performance
executory on both sides; while in contracts of this class, the acceptance furnishes
not only the consideration, but also the performance on one side. A distinctive
name for a contract of this sort is undoubtedly to be desired; and the term "uni-
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lateral" is satisfactory enough as far as derivation is concerned. The objection
to it is that it is already used too much, with too many meanings.'
Thus, in 1920, Professor Page recognized a problem which has today
grown into a greater enigma for law students and practicing attorneys
everywhere.
In the light of the modern concepts and terminology of Williston,2
Corbin,' the Restatement of the Law of Contracts, and the cases4 which
have adopted their "language" in regard to the use of the words "uni-
lateral" and "unilateral contracts," it is difficult, if not impossible, to read
and interpret past and recent Illinois decisions which have dealt with the
problem.
Williston defines a unilateral contract as one "where only one prom-
ises performance, the consideration from the promisee being actually
given and being something other than a promise." 5 In § 65 Williston says,
"An offer for a unilateral contract generally requires an act on the part
of the offeree to make a binding contract. This act is consideration for
the promise contained in the offer and doing it with intent to accept
without more will create a contract." The Restatement of the Law of
Contracts recognizes that "(i)n a unilateral contract, the exchange for
the promise is something other than a promise. . . .There must always
be at least two parties to a contract, whether unilateral or bilateral ..
Corbin says:
The term unilateral contract . . . means ... that the promise or promises have
been made by one party alone... however, the promise of this party will not be
an enforceable contract unless a sufficient consideration has been given in return
for it .... In most cases, therefore, even though a contract may properly be de-
scribed as unilateral, it takes two persons to make it.... In all cases of "bargain,"
one party offers his promise in exchange for a specified consideration; and in
order to "close the deal" and make a "contract" that consideration must be given.
If this consideration is action or a forbearance instead of a promise, the resulting
contract is "unilateral;" it nevertheless takes two to make it.7
It can be seen, therefore, that three of the foremost authorities on the
subject of contracts speak of a unilateral contract in the following sense-
' Page, The Law of Contracts S 51 (2d ed., 1920).
2 Williston, Contracts (1st ed., 1920); Williston, Contracts (rev. ed. by Williston and
Thompson, 1936).
3 Corbin, Contracts (1950).
4 Mid-Century, Limited v. United Cigar-Whelan St. Corp., 109 F. Supp. 433 (D.D.C.,
1953); Byram v. Vaughn, 68 F. Supp. 981, 983 (D.D.C., 1946); Martendell v. Fiduciary
Counsel, 131 N.J. Eq. 523, 26 A. 2d 171 (1942), aff'd 133 N.J. Eq. 408, 30 A. 2d 28 (1943).
5 1 Williston, Contracts § 13 (rev. ed., 1936) (Emphasis added).
6 Rest., Contracts S 12, Comments a and b (1932).
7 1 Corbin, Contracts S 21 (1950).
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an offer for an act, the unilateral contract coming into existence when the
act is performed. The use of the words, "unilateral contract," appears to
be limited to the definitions above mentioned. The Illinois courts have not
so limited their concept of these words, nor have they seen fit to adopt
the use of the words as indicated by the above authorities.
ATTEMPTED BILATERAL CONTRACTS VOID FOR WANT OF MUTUALITY
ARE CALLED UNILATERAL CONTRACTS
Illinois courts have repeatedly held in situations where there was a lack
of mutuality of obligation that, ". . the contemplated contract was uni-
lateral and void for want of mutuality. . ." These cases seem to say
that because a contract lacks mutuality of obligation, (each party in a
bilateral contract making a valid promise to make it a valid bilateral con-
tract) it is therefore, a unilateral contract and void. Williston says that the
use of the term unilateral contract has nothing to do with bilateral con-
tracts.
•.. The term "unilateral contracts" should be reserved for cases where a legal
obligation has been created, but only one party to the obligation has made a
promise. Where there is no obligation, the transaction may be a unilateral prom-
ise or a unilateral offer, but it certainly cannot properly be called a unilateral
contract.9
In Schlitz Brewing Co. v. Komp,10 the defendant promised to purchase
from the plaintiff brewery company exclusively, for five years, the beer
manufactured by the company. Before the expiration of the period, de-
fendant stopped buying the plaintiff's beer. The contract was held uni-
lateral for while it bound the defendant to use only the plaintiff's beer,
it did not obligate Schlitz to sell any to the defendant. "As a general rule
a unilateral contract of that kind, whereby one party is bound and the
other is not, will not be specifically enforced in a court of equity.""
The interpretation of the court in the case of Weber v. Hulbert,12
where the plaintiff promised to purchase some property from the defend-
ant, but nowhere in the alleged contract did the defendant promise to
sell, was:
8 Olsen v. Whiffen, 175 Ill. App. 182, 185 (1912); See Crane v. Crane Co., 105 F. 869
(C.A. 7th, 1901), where it was held that a promise by X to provide all the lumber
needed by Y during 1897 was void, the court on page 872 saying that "It is needless
to say that such a contract is unilateral and void for want of mutuality." Accord: Joliet
Bottling Co. v. Joliet Citizens' Brewing Co., 254 Ill. 215, 98 N.E. 263 (1912).
9 1 Williston, Contracts S 13 (rev. ed., 1936).
10 118 111. App. 566 (1905).
11 Ibid., at 569 (Emphasis added). Accord: American Refrigeration Transit Co. v.
Chilton, 94 111. App. 6 (1900).
12 225 111. App. 321, 329 (1922) (Emphasis added).
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If the so-called proposal, as finally signed by the parties at the time shown,
be considered as an attempt to incorporate into a contract all the terms of the
purchase of the lot ... it is void as a unilateral contract.... The contract, if it
is a contract, is unilateral, lacking in mutuality and void.
It can be seen, therefore, that the courts speak of an alleged bilateral
contract that lacks mutuality of obligation, as a unilateral contract, void
because of a lack of mutuality of obligation. The proper analysis is that
there existed no contract at all.
OFFERS TO ENTER INTO UNILATERAL CONTRACTS SPOKEN OF AS BEING
UNILATERAL CONTRACTS AND VOID FOR WANT OF
MUTUALITY OF OBLIGATION
Illustrative of this heading is the case of Alexander Hamilton Institute
v. Jones's where there was an offer by defendant to make certain pay-
ments in consideration of a series of acts to be done by the plaintiff. The
court said, "On the face of the paper it is merely an offer by the defend-
ant and not enforceable until accepted by plaintiff so as to bind it to
perform. It is what is sometimes called a unilateral contract void for want
of mutuality." The court in this case called an offer (to enter into a uni-
lateral contract) a unilateral contract, void for want of a mutuality of
obligation. A simpler and more correct analysis is that it is an offer to
enter into a unilateral contract.
Part of the agreement in Hanlon v. Dunne14 read, "In consideration of
your services in endeavoring to sell the said property I agree to pay you
in case of a sale a commission. . . ." The plaintiff subsequently made ef-
forts to find a buyer. The court held that "a contract to pay a real estate
agent commissions, though unilateral in its inception, becomes a valid and
binding contract where the agent commences to sell the property."' 5
Contrary to the Alexander Hamilton case, Central Guarantee Co. v.
Fourth Central Trust Co. 6 recognized the concept of "an offer for an
act." The court did not call the offer a unilateral contract. There the
defendant promised to pay, following the date of contract, and annually
thereafter, for five years, on the receipt of a certain book. Two copies
were sent in successive years, the defendant paid the price, and then
cancelled its order. In determining that the defendant could withdraw
13 234 111. App. 444, 446 (1924).
14 189 111. App. 123, 124 (1914).
15 Ibid., at 125 (Emphasis added). It is not the purpose of this comment to discuss
the validity of the statement of the court as to when the agent is entitled to his com-
mission; however, for recent decisions contra see Nicholson v. Alderson, 347 IM. App.
496, 107 N.E. 2d 39 (1952); Bartlett v. Keith, 325 Mass. 265, 90 N.E. 2d 308 (1950).
16 244 Ill. App. 61 (1927).
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the offer at any time before the actual shipment of the book, the court
said, "... the writing is merely a unilateral offer .... 17
THE DOCTRINE OF MUTUALITY IN REGARD TO UNILATERAL CONTRACTS
Plumb v. Campbell" is perhaps the most frequently cited of all Illinois
cases when a court is referring to unilateral contracts. The defendant in
this case agreed to sell certain bonds within twenty days after the plaintiff
gave them to him. The plaintiff did give him the bonds. The court, though
it did not expressly so state, recognized that this was an offer to enter
into a unilateral contract. In reply to the defendant's contention that
since there was nothing obliging the plaintiff to comply with the contract
and that, therefore, the contract was void for want of mutuality of obli-
gation, the court said:
It does not follow, however, that a contract in writing, to be complete, must
show such mutuality on its face. There is a seeming want of mutuality in many
cases of contracts which may be enforced by the parties on the same proof as
would have been necessary had that mutuality fully appeared,-"as where one
promises to see another paid if he would sell goods to a third person, or promises
to give a certain sum if another will deliver up certain documents or securities,
or if he will forbear a demand, or suspend legal proceedings, or the like."'1
The court continues, by quoting from Parsons:
The party making the promise is bound to nothing until the promisee, within
a reasonable time, engages to do, or else does or begins to do, the thing which
is the condition of the first promise. Until such engagement or such doing, the
promisor may withdraw his promise, because there is no mutuality, and there-
fore no consideration for it.20
Concluding its discussion of the concept of a unilateral contract the court
says that, "A promise lacking mutuality at its inception becomes binding
upon the promisor after performance by the promisee. These contracts
are sometimes called unilateral contracts."'' 1
Whereas previous cases cited mentioned "mutuality of obligation" and
IT Ibid., at 64; cf. Kinder v. McCormick, 82 Ill. 376 (1876).
18 129 111. 101, 18 N.E. 790 (1888). 19 Ibid., at 106 and 791.
20 1 Parsons, Contracts 5 450 (7th ed., 1883); Plumb v. Campbell, 129 Ill. 101, 106, 18
N.E. 790, 791 (1888). For a discussion of what constitutes performance of the act by
the offeree see Rest., Contracts §§ 45 and 59 (1932). In Comment A of § 45, it is said
that, "Beginning preparations though they may be essential to carrying out the contract
or to accepting the offer, is not enough." In Anderson, Mutual Assent in Unilateral
Contracts Since the Restatement, I De Paul L. Rev. 167, 172-178 (1952), there is a dis-
cussion of what does constitute performance of the act called for by the promisor along
with an interesting analysis of Kaiser v. Better Farms, 249 Wis. 302, 24 N.W. 2d 621
(1946), which case applied the doctrine of substantial performance to unilateral con-
tracts.
21 Plumb v. Campbell, 129 Ill. 101, 107, 18 N.E. 790, 792 (1888).
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"unilateral" when actually talking about alleged bilateral contracts, the
Plumb case recognized that the contract was unilateral but apparently
felt some need to refer to the doctrine of mutuality of obligation in reach-
ing its decision. The doctrine of mutuality of obligation, according to
Corbin, should be used only when referring to bilateral contracts:
Mutuality of obligation should be used solely to express the idea that each
party is under a legal duty to the other; each has made a promise and each is an
obligor. This is the meaning with which the term is commonly used. There are
cases, however, in which it is otherwise defined. In order to save the supposed
requirement of "mutuality," it is sometimes declared that it means nothing more
than that there must be a sufficient consideration. Even though one of the parties
has made no promise and is bound by no duty, the contract has sufficient mutu-
ality if he has given an executed consideration. Thus, the validity of a unilateral
contract is recognized, at the same time appearing not to run counter to the re-
quirement of mutuality. While the result reached in these cases is sound, such a
method of rationalizing it merely perpetuates confusion of thought. There are
now plenty of case that clearly recognize the validity of a unilateral contract.
Courts now often say correctly that it is consideration that is necessary, not
mutuality of obligation.22
The doctrine was correctly held inapplicable in Schmidt v. Marine Milk
Condensing Co.2 3 There the defendant promised to pay a certain amount
of money to plaintiff upon delivery of milk to the defendant. Plaintiff
delivered the milk but defendant would not pay him the full price. In its
analysis of the situation the court said:
Where in accordance with an offer to accept and pay for certain goods at a
stipulated price, the delivery thereof is made and accepted, the offer becomes
a binding promise to pay therefor, even though the seller was not bound to
deliver, the doctrine of mutuality having no application in such case.
Another Illinois court, handling the problem with more care and thought
than in the Plumb case said:
While consideration is essential to the validity of a contract, mutuality of obli-
gation is not. . . . If mutuality, in a broad sense, were held to be an essential
element in every valid contract, to the extent that both contracting parties could
sue on it, there could be no such thing as a valid unilateral . . . contract. Such
contracts have long been recognized ... in Illinois. 24
UNILATERAL CONTRACTS IN REGARD TO OPTIONS
On being confronted with options, Illinois courts have often referred
to the terms "unilateral" and "unilateral contracts." Four situations, based
essentially on the same set of facts are herein discussed to indicate the lack
221 Corbin, Contracts § 152 (1950) (Emphasis added).
23 197 I11. App. 279, 281 (1915).
24 Armstrong Paint Works v. Continental Can Co., 301 Ill. 102, 108, 133 N.E. 711, 714
(1922).
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of uniformity with which Illinois courts have referred to options in con-
nection with the terms "unilateral" and "unilateral contracts."
X offered to sell certain premises to Y for $1,000. In consideration for $100
paid by Y to X, X promised to keep the offer open for one year.
In discussing this "paid for" offer, three of the four courts found it neces-
sary to use the word "unilateral" or "unilateral contract."
1. Lake Shore Country Club v. Brand:
25
An option contract is unilateral. Under it the optionee has a right to purchase
upon the terms and under the conditions therein named. He is not, however,
bound to purchase. Because but one party is bound thereby and the other is not,
courts will exercise their discretion with great care in determining whether such
a unilateral contract has been converted into a bilateral contract.
2. Estes v. Furlong:
20
Where the contract is in anywise unilateral, as in the case of an option to pur-
chase . . . in compliance with it, is regarded with especial strictness, for then
laches would be more easily fixed upon the vendee, than where the contract
was of ordinary character.
3. Northern Illinois Coal Corp. v. Cryder:
27
An option, so long as it remains unaccepted is a unilateral writing lacking the
mutual elements of a contract, but when accepted by the optionee there emerges,
as the result of such acceptance, an executory contract inter partes ... for the
sale and purchase of the optioned property, mutually binding upon the optionor
and optionee and containing mutual rights and obligations enforceable as such
in accordance with the established rules relating to executory contracts.
4. Bates v. Woods:
28
[I]f there is an offer by one to do a certain thing, and a promise on his part,
without any valuable consideration therefor, to leave the offer open for a limited
period, no contract is thereby created, because one of the essential elements of a
contract, viz., the consideration is lacking, but that where there is a valuable
consideration for the promise to leave the offer open for a limited period a con-
tract arises whereby one acquires a right to accept or reject the offer, within the
time limited,-or, expressed in words of the same meaning, a contract arises
whereby one acquires. . an option.
Case four found it unnecessary to use the words "unilateral" or "uni-
lateral contract," showing that an option can be discussed without ref-
erence to these words. Cases one, two, and three used these words but
the courts in employing them lacked uniformity.
25 339 Ill. 504, 521, 171 N.E. 494, 501 (1930) (Emphasis added). Accord: Robbs v. Illi-
nois Rural Rehabilitation Corp., 313 111. App. 418, 40 N.E. 2d 549 (1942).
20 59 l. 298, 302 (1871).
27 361 M. 274, 283, 197 N.E. 750, 755 (1935) (Emphasis added).
28 225 111. 126, 131, 80 N.E. 84, 85 (1907).
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One Illinois court in discussing :in offer that vas not paid for, said,
regarding options:
An option contract is an executed unilateral contract and not an executory
one.... An option is a right acquired by contract to accept or reject a present
offer within the time limited. In such contract two elements exist: first, the offer
to sell, which does not become a contract until accepted; second, a contract to
leave the offer open for a specified time. It is clearly apparent that an option is a
contract and must, therefore, necessarily contain all the incidents of a contract,
among them being the requirement of the existence of a valuable consideration.
The so-called option in this case does not specify a time for performance by the
optionee, nor was there any consideration given for it. We are of the opinion,
therefore, that the instrument sued upon was not an option but was more in the
nature of a unilateral offer. 29
Further confusion is illustrated by referring back to the case of North-
ern Illinois Coal Corp. v. Cryder.30 There, after calling an option a uni-
lateral writing the court states that since it lacks mutuality of obligation,
it is not a contract. This holding is contrary to the accepted principle
that a paid for offer is a contract and that lack of mutuality is of no
importance. In Anderson v. Bills31 the court held that the rule of mutality
of obligation did not apply to, "unilateral or option contracts." The court,
contrary to the Northern Coal case, recognized that an option is a con-
tract, but used the words unilateral contract. The court quotes from Page
who said:
An option is said to be "a unilateral agreement" binding upon the party who
executes it from the date of its execution, and it becomes a contract inter partes
when exercised according to its terms. 32
It was concluded by the court that "The contract in this case was an
option or unilateral contract and by its terms it was binding upon one
party alone and could be specifically enforced against that party.P33
It can be seen, therefore, that the Illinois courts differ as to what is an
option, and it is difficult, after reading the cases, to understand the signif-
icance, correctness, consequences, and purpose of using the term unilateral
in regard to option contracts.
Williston, defining an option, says, "If consideration is paid for an
offer ... the offer is a contract .... Such contracts are generally called
options." 34 The Restatement of the Law of Contracts, in speaking of op-
tions, likewise does not mention unilateral contracts:
29 Whitelaw v. Brady, 3 1ll. 2d 583,589, 121 N.E. 2d 785,789 (1954) (Emphasis added).
30 Authority cited note 27 supra. 3' 335 IUI. 524, 167 N.E. 864 (1929).
32 Page, Contracts 5 571 (2d ed., 1920); 335 Ill. 524, 528, 167 N.E. 864, 866 (1929).
33 Anderson v. Bills, 335 111. 524, 528, 529, 167 N.E. 864, 866 (1929).
:4 1 Williston, Contracts 5 61 (rev. ed., 1936).
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The word "option" is often used for any continuing offer regardless of
whether it is revocable for lack of consideration; but more commonly the word
is used to denote an offer that is irrevocable and therefore a contract.3 5
To make unqualified statements, such as were made in several of the
above cases, that an, "option contract is unilateral," can be deceiving.
Corbin, for instance, says:
An option contract can be either unilateral or bilateral .... If A pays B $100
cash in return for B's promise to convey Blackacre to A for $5,000 if paid within
30 days, they have made a unilateral option contract. A has an irrevocable option
to buy, good for 30 days; he has made no promise of any kind, being equally
privileged to buy or not to buy-his option or freedom of choice is wholly un-
limited. Nevertheless, B's promise is binding because he has been paid $100 for it.
On the other hand, suppose that instead of paying cash A had given to B his
promissory note for $100, or his oral promise to pay that sum, in return for B's
promise to convey Blackacre to A for $5,000, if paid within 30 days. The con-
tract thus made is bilateral, each party having made a binding promise.3 6
According to Corbin's analysis, an option contract may be bilateral as well
as unilateral and the unqualified statement that an option contract is uni-
lateral is incorrect. Since neither Williston or the Restatement use the
words "unilateral contract," and because its use tends to be confusing, and
since no purpose is served in calling an option a "unilateral contract," it
would be helpful if the words were omitted completely.
CONCLUSION
Professor Page apparently did not think that the term "unilateral con-
tract" was the best that could be used to describe "an offer for an act."
Perhaps it is not, but as it now stands, the term is in existence and appears
likely to remain firmly entrenched in the legal vocabulary. The problem
lies in the fact that the words "unilateral contract" have been tossed
about carelessly and confusion has been the result.
The Illinois courts have varied in their repeated use of the terms. If
"unilateral" and "unilateral contract" were used uniformly, or better yet,
used as defined by Williston, Corbin, and the Restatement, much of the
confusion revolving around the law of unilateral contracts would be
cleared up.
35 § 24 Comment c. 30 1 Corbin, Contracts § 260 (1950).
BASES FOR AWARDING COMPENSATION TO TRUSTEES
Historically, the law as expressed in the early English cases and in some
of the American jurisdictions was that a trustee was not entitled to com-
pensation for his services and time in administering a trust. The trustee's
efforts were merely gratuitous without regard to any advantage that
